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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

McCulErnc or CHANGE or LAW UPON OBLIGATION TO PAY RZZNT.-In
W. 33,
N.
165
1917),
lough Realty Co. v. Laemmle Film Service, (Nov. 16,

the supreme court of Iowa had occasion to pass upon a question which has
become increasingly frequent with the spread of prohibition laws, namely,
law
the effect upon the obligation of a tenant to pay rent, of a subsequent
that makes it unlawful for him to use the premises for the purpose for which
he leased them. The case before the Iowa court was not one arising out of
a lease of premises for saloon purposes, but the question involved was precisely the same, and the saloon cases were relied upon for the decision. The
action was for rent upon a written lease containing the following clause:
"Said premises are leased for Film Exchange and film and theatre supplies
purposes only and are not to be used for any unlawful or offensive purposes
whatever.' The defendant contended that by reason of a city ordinance,
passed after the demise, providing that it should be unlawful to store, handle,
etc. any inflammable motion picture films in buildings which are not fireproof, it had become impossible to use the premises for the purposes for
which they were leased. The lessee had vacated the premises. It appeared
that the handling of films was 99 per-cent of the business of a film exchange,
and that it was wholly impracticable to keep the films at one place and have
the office at another. Being of opinion that "the entire beneficial use of the
leased premises was prevented by the ordinance", the court held the defendant freed of the obligation to pay rent.
Where a lease contains a clause permitting the premises to be used for
saloon purposes and the premises are in fact so used, a subsequent change
in the law making it unlawful to operate a saloon does not affect the tenant's
rent liability. Hayton v. Seattle Brewing and Malting Co., (IgI), 66 Wash.
248, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 432; Hyatt v. Grand Rapids Brewing Co., (1912),
168 Mich. 36D. But where the lease restricted the use of the premises to such
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purpose, such subsequent change in the law was held to release the tenant.
The Stratford Inc. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., (i916), 94 Wash. 125,
L. R. A. 1917 C 931. So also in Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing Co., (I9o8),
121 Tenn. 69, i9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 964; Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson, (1912),
179 Ala. 444, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 664; Kahn v. Wilhelm, (915), ix8 Ark.
239. On the other hand, it has been held that even when the use of the leased
premises is restricted to the business later made unlawful, there is no release from rent liability. Lawrence v. White, (igog), 131 Ga. 840, 19 L. R A.
(N. S.) 966 dictum; Goodrum Tobacco Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co.,
(Io), 133 Ga. 776, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 498; Hecht v. Acme Coal Co., (1911),
Ig Wyo. i8, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 773 semble.
If the subsequent change in law does not prevent entirely the beneficial
use of the demised premises, the tenant may be held liable despite the fact
that he is prevented from carrying on the principal business for which the
premises were taken. Standard Brewing Co. v. Weil, (1916), 129 Md. 487.
So where a "saloon" is considered as not necessarily a place where intoxicating liquors are sold, the tenant must pay, for he may dispense soft drinks,
etc. O'Byrne v. Henley, (i9o9), I6I Ala. 62o, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496; Hecht
v. Acme Coal Co., supra; In re Bradley, (915), 225 Fed. 307.
That a "saloon" is not necessarily a place where intoxicants are sold, see
also Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325. Such liberal meaning of the word,
however, has been denied. The Stratford, Inc. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., supra. But where the lease restricts the use of the premises to purposes of a "bar" or "bar-room", it is considered that intoxicating liquors are
to be sold. Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson, supra, and in The Stratford, Inc. v.
Seattle Brewing & Halting Co., supra, the tenant was deemed discharged
despite the fact that by a modification of the lease permission had been given
to operate on the premises a bootblacking stand and a restaurant and to sell .
tobacco, the court going on the ground that the running of a saloon was the
real purpose for which the premises had been leased; it was that which fixed
the rental. The principal case thus accords with the case just cited. See also
Kahn v. Wilhelm, supra.
The decisions that the lessee is relieved from his obligation to pay rent
are not agreed as to the reason for such result. In the Heart case the court
went on the ground that the purpose for which the lease was made having
become unlawful the whole lease "became and is void and unenforceable at
the instance of either party." In the Greil Bros. Co. case the court speaks
of subsequent impossibility of performance by reason of change in law and
also of destruction of a thing the continued existence of which is assumed
as a basis of the agreement. Kahn, v. Wilhelm went on the ground that the
performance having become unlawful the contract was void. And in The
Stratford case the court treated the problem as covered by the general rule
that performance of a contract is excused when by subsequent change in
law the acts called for are rendered unlawful.
Where premises are leased and it is stipulated that they shall be used
only for a certain purpose and by a change in law such use is made unlawful,
it is of course perfectly clear that the tenant could not be required to abide
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by the restrictive term of the lease. Baily v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q.
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said by some courts? Should such illegality
drop such restrictive provision out of the lease? The lessee would'then be
left free to use the premises for any lawful purpose. If the whole lease is to
be treated as at an end, must it not be on the theory that a condition to that
effect is to be implied? As to whether there is sufficient reason for reading
such a condition into such leases there may well be differences of opinion.
It is not surprising then, as pointed out above, that the cases are. not agreed;
but it is believed that the cases holding the lessee completely discharged at
least have gone on unsound grounds.
In support of the view that the lessee should be relieved Hooper v. Mudler, (igog), 158 Mich. 595, is apt to be cited. There it was held that the provisions of the "local-option law" having become operative in the county in
which were saloon premises held by defendant as lessee, he was released from
the obligation of paying rent. It must be observed that the lessors had there
agreed "that in case they are unable to furnish, that is, secure, for the said
second parties, or the tenant of said parties, two sufficient bondsmen required
by law in case of retail dealers in malt and spirituous liquors, at second'
parties's own proper expense, however, then this lease shall be and become
void". The vote in favor of local option having made it impossible for the
lessors to furnish such bondsmen, the lease by its very terms was void, and
the court so held. The case, then, does not furnish any ruling whatever on
the main question under discussion. The Arkansas court, however, in Kahn
v. Wilhelm, supra, failed completely to appreciate what the court had to
R. W. A.
decide in Hooper v. Mueller.
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